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1. Introduction
An enduring topic of economic policy is the study of the e®ects of changes in ¯scal and
monetary instruments on the ¯nancial position of the public sector. Indeed, discussions in
the political arena often revolve around the question of the response of policy to current
¯scal de¯cits or surpluses. For example, a major focus of the recent presidential campaign
in the United States was the question of the allocation of the current budget surplus
between tax cuts, new expenditure, and debt reduction. The major political parties had
strikingly di®erent tax and spending proposals, with the Republicans o®ering signi¯cantly
lower taxes and the Democrats advocating a \paying-down" of the Federal debt within
a speci¯ed period of time. An oft-cited justi¯cation of tax cuts is that they pay|at
least partially|for themselves, since they also increase the level of economic activity
and, consequently, the tax base. Early discussions of the supply-side impact of tax cuts
focused on whether a reduction in the marginal tax rate on labor income would lead to
an increase in tax revenues through greater work-e®ort. The empirical consensus that
emerged subsequently was that the response of labor supply to changes in the after-tax
real wage, at least in the United States, was too small to generate such La®er-curve
e®ects.1
This issue has been revisited recently as researchers have applied the insights of endoge-
nous growth theory to the relationship between ¯scal policy decisions and the dynamic
evolution of the government budget.2 The earlier La®er argument was static in nature,
since it relied on a one-time increase in labor supply and output to lead to a rise in the
level of tax revenues and, thus, to a corresponding decrease in the size of the govern-
ment budget de¯cit. The newer research, as exempli¯ed by Ireland (1994) and Bruce
and Turnovsky (1999), considers the e®ect of government expenditure and tax policy not
1See La®er (1979) for an early statement of the potential supply-side e®ects of tax reductions. More
recently, Slemrod (1994) found evidence that a La®er curve e®ect holds for high-income earners.
2Authors who analyzed the in°uence of government expenditure and tax policy on the equilibrium
rate of growth include Barro (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), Rebelo (1991), and Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1993).
only on the growth rate of the economy, but also on the growth rate of the tax base, the
path of government debt, and the value of future tax payments required to maintain the
intertemporal solvency of the public sector. As discussed by Bruce and Turnovsky, this
e®ect on the growth of the tax base opens-up the possibility of intertemporal La®er-curve
e®ects, which they call dynamic scoring. In other words, ¯scal policies can be \scored"
in terms of their impact on long-run value of future tax payments. For instance, if the
growth in the tax base is su±ciently great subsequent to a cut in taxes, it is then possible
that a cut in current taxes lowers the present discounted value of future tax liabilities.
This can be the case even if the cut in taxes results in a decline in current tax revenues.
In their closed economy model Bruce and Turnovsky derive the conditions under which
dynamic scoring takes place subsequent to a cut in income taxes and show that it can
occur if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.3
Bianconi (1999) extends the work of Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) by introducing
nominal assets|and hence an in°ation tax|into his analysis. He ¯nds that the existence
of nominal assets introduces another channel through which changes in ¯scal policy can
a®ect the long-term tax liability of the private sector. Through the mechanisms of greater
in°ation tax revenue and price level e®ects that lower the burden of the public sector
real debt, he shows that changes in both government expenditure and tax policy can
reduce the long-run tax liability. Bianconi supports these analytical results with numerical
simulations that suggest the role of nominal assets in determining future tax liabilities
may be of empirical relevance.
In this paper we will extend this analysis to a small open economy that includes nomi-
nal assets. We think this is an useful extension in light of the increasing integration of the
world economy and because rules enforcing public sector ¯nancial stability are becoming a
more important part of multi-lateral economic agreements, such as the Maastrict criterion
for European monetary integration. We will develop a single-good, small open economy
3Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) also derive the conditions for the implementation of welfare-maximizing
¯scal policy. This will not be our concern here, although our model can be employed to address this
issue. See also Agell and Persson (2000).
2
model in which physical capital accumulation, as in Turnovsky (1996), is the engine of
economic growth. In addition to spending real resources, the government in our model
levies lump-sum and income taxes and issues internationally traded bonds and domestic
money balances.
After deriving for the economy's equilibrium growth path, we will consider the e®ects
of the following policy shocks on the value of future tax liabilities: an increase in the
share of government expenditure in output; a cut in the capital tax rate, holding the
share of government expenditure constant; a balanced-budget cut in the capital tax rate
in which share of government expenditure in output falls with the tax rate; and a change
in the rate of growth of nominal balances. We examine these questions by analyzing the
solution to the theoretical model and by conducting a numerical simulation exercise. In
the case in which the proportion of lump-sum taxes in output is held constant, we show
for an increase in the share of government expenditure that dynamic scoring|in contrast
to Bianconi (1999)|cannot take place. Indeed, the existence of nominal assets in the
small open economy case tends to magnify the increase in the private sector's future tax
liabilities subsequent to this government expenditure shock. We show that this is due to
the fact that small open economy is constrained to de°ate its public sector debt by the
exogenous foreign price level, which implies that the value of government assets cannot
be eroded through a higher domestic price level. In this context, we also derive the
conditions in which dynamic scoring can take place subsequent to a reduction in capital
taxes, both holding the share of government expenditure constant and in the balanced
budget case. We show that a crucial factor in determining the response of future tax
liabilities is the share of government expenditure in output compared to the (initial) rate
of capital taxation. As in the case of the government expenditure shock, the response
of in°ation tax revenues is important in scaling the change in the future tax liability.
If the response of in°ation tax revenues is su±ciently strong, it can even qualitatively
determine the change in the future tax liability. We show in our simulation exercise that
while dynamic scoring does not occur subsequent to a cut in capital taxes, given our choice
of parameters, it does take place in the case of a balanced-budget tax cut. In addition,
3
we examine the impact of increasing the rate of growth of nominal balances. This policy
shock does reduce, through greater in°ation tax revenues, the future tax liabilities of the
public, although less than in the closed economy due the lack of price level e®ects just
described.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the private sector and derives
its optimal intertemporal choices. The asset constraints of the public sector and the
current account balance are also introduced in this section. In section 3 we calculate the
growth equilibrium of the open economy and derive the expressions for the equilibrium
current account balance, real money balances, aggregate stock of wealth, and consumer
welfare. We next determine in section 4 the e®ect of ¯scal and monetary policy variables
on the economy's equilibrium growth rate, the initial levels of consumption and real money
balances, and overall welfare. In section 5, which contains the major results of the paper,
we calculate the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint and consider how changes
in the government expenditure, tax, and monetary policy a®ect the private sector's the
intertemporal tax burden, paying particular attention to the role of nominal assets. We
then simulate these results numerically in section 6. Section 7 brie°y concludes.
2. The Model
In this section we will describe the components of the small open economy model. The
economy produces, consumes, and trades a single good with a ¯xed terms of trade equal
to unity. As such, purchasing power parity holds. This implies|in percentage terms|the
relationship p = p¤+e, where p is the domestic rate of in°ation, p¤ is the exogenous foreign
rate of in°ation, and e is the rate of depreciation of the domestic in terms of the foreign
currency.4 The economy is also \small" in terms of international ¯nancial markets, since
it takes as given the world nominal interest rate, which is linked to the domestic nominal
rate according to uncovered interest parity, i = i¤+e, where i is the domestic and i¤ is the
4In levels this corresponds to EP¤=P = 1 where E is the level of the nominal exchange rate and P ,
P ¤ are, respectively, the domestic and foreign price levels.
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world nominal interest rate. Let us next specify the optimization problem of the private
sector.
2.1. The Private Sector
We model the private sector as a representative consumer-producer, who solves the fol-
lowing maximization problem
Z = max
Z 1
0
U (c;m) e¡±tdt (1)
subject to
_m+ _b+©(I;K) = (1¡ ¿)®K + (i¤ ¡ p¤)b¡ c¡ (p¤ + e)m¡ T; (2a)
_K = I (2b)
and the following exogenous initial stocks of assets
K(0) = K0 > 0; M(0) =M0 > 0; b(0) = b0 = B0=P
¤
0 > 0 (2c)
where c = consumption, m = M=P = the real stock of domestic money balances,
b = B=P ¤ = the real stock of international bonds, P = the domestic price level, P ¤ =
the exogenous foreign price level, M = the nominal money supply in terms of domestic
currency, B = the nominal stock of international bonds in terms of foreign currency, K =
the stock of domestic physical capital, I = the level of investment expenditure, ± = the
exogenous consumer rate of time preference, ¿ = the tax rate on physical capital, and
T = the level of lump-sum taxes imposed by the domestic government, (the °ow budget
constraint for the domestic government will be introduced below). According to equation
(1), the agent receives utility services, as in Sidrausky (1967), from real consumption and
real money balances. Observe in equation (2a) that the representative agent accumu-
lates domestic money, foreign bonds, and gross{of{cost additions to the physical capital
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stock, the latter represented by the function ©(K; I), which we will specify below. This is
the residual after consumption expenditure, the in°ation tax on real money balances, and
lump-sum taxes have been subtracted from after-tax output and real interest income from
foreign bonds, where (i¤ ¡ p¤) is world real interest rate. The agent uses a linear produc-
tion function Y = ®K, ® > 0, where Y represents domestic output. As in Rebelo (1991),
Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and Bianconi (1999), the level of employment is exogenous.
This permits us to concentrate on the intertemporal growth e®ects of government policy,
rather on the static e®ects, which depend largely on changes in the level of work e®ort.
The °ow constraint for the accumulation of domestic capital is given by equation (2b)
and abstracts from physical depreciation.
To simplify to the solution of the agent's optimization problem, we follow Bianconi
(1999) and specify that U(c;m) and ©(K; I) assume the following functional forms:
U(c;m) = log c + ° logm; ° > 0; (3a)
© (K; I) = I + (h=2)(I2=K) = I [1 + (h=2)(I=K)] ; h > 0: (3b)
Equation (3a) implies that both consumption and real balances have an intertemporal
elasticity equal to unity and that the parameter ° weighs the utility services of money.
Note that our speci¯cation means that the domestic economy does not accumulate foreign
money balances and, further, that domestic money does not \leak-out" abroad.5 Equa-
tion (3b) is a standard quadratic representation, following Hayashi (1982), of the convex
installation costs of physical capital, where the parameter h measures the \slope" of the
marginal cost of investing an additional unit of output. This formulation prevents the
physical capital stock of the small open economy from taking discrete jumps.6
To obtain the solution to the representative agent's maximization problem, we form
5In other words, the issue of currency substitution does not arise in our model, although it could be
easily extended to do so.
6See Turnovsky (1997), Chapters 3 and 5, for an extensive discussion of the use of functions such as
(3b) in an open economy context.
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the following current value Hamiltonian
H = log c+ ° logm+ ¸f(1¡ ¿)®K + (i¤ ¡ p¤)b¡ I[1 + (h=2)(I=K)];
¡c¡ (p+ e)m¡ Tg+ q0I (4)
where ¸ is the costate variable associated with the constraint (2a) and represents the
shadow value of ¯nancial wealth, while q0 ´ q¸ is the shadow value, in terms of ¯nancial
wealth, of the domestic capital stock. The necessary conditions for consumption, real
balances, investment, foreign bonds, and domestic capital are given, respectively, by the
following expressions
1
c
= ¸; (5a)
_¸ = (± + p¤ + e)¸¡ 1
°m
; (5b)
1 + h
I
K
= q; (5c)
_¸ = [± ¡ (i¤ ¡ p¤)]¸; (5d)
(1¡ ¿ )®
q
+
_q
q
+
(q ¡ 1)2
2hq
= (i¤ ¡ p¤) (5e)
and include the following transversality conditions for foreign bonds, real money balances
and physical capital:
lim
t!1¸be
¡±t = lim
t!1¸me
¡±t = lim
t!1 q¸Ke
¡±t = 0. (5f)
Equation (5a) states that the marginal utility of consumption equals the shadow value
of wealth, ¸, while (5c) equates the marginal cost of investment to its shadow value, q.
Equations (5b, d) are the marginal conditions for money balances and bonds in terms of
the rate of return of consumption. This can be seen by rewriting these two conditions as
± ¡
_¸
¸
=
°
¸m
¡ (p¤ + e) = (i¤ ¡ p¤) (6a)
7
where the left-hand-side represents the rate of return of consumption and the next two
equalities represent the real rates of return, respectively, of real money balances and bonds.
Noting equation (5e), these are equal to the after-tax rate of return of physical capital.
Observe that equation (5c) can be rewritten as the rate of accumulation of physical capital
I
K
=
_K
K
=
q ¡ 1
h
´ Á (6b)
where Á denotes the growth rate of the capital stock (and output). This implies the path
of the capital stock, starting from the initial value K0, equals:
K(t) = K0e
R t
0
Á(s)ds. (6c)
2.2. The Public Sector and the Current Account Balance
We now introduce a public sector that issues internationally traded bonds and domestic
money balances to cover the °ow di®erence between real expenditures, interest service,
and aggregate tax revenues, where the latter consists of lump-sum taxes, the revenues
from the capital income tax and real money balances.7 In this framework government
expenditure does not add to the agent's utility or to the productivity of output. As such,
it merely withdraws resources from the private sector. This implies the following public
sector °ow budget constraint
_a+ _m = G+ (i¤ ¡ p¤)a¡ T ¡ ¿®K ¡ (p¤ + e)m (7a)
whereG is real government expenditure and a is the real stock of internationally traded do-
mestic government bonds, where (i¤¡p¤)a represents real interest service.8 We also assume
that government bonds evolve from a given initial value such that a(0) = a0 = A0=P
¤
0 > 0,
7In order enhance the transparency of our subsequent results, we restrict ourselves to just two distor-
tionary taxes, the income tax and the in°ation tax. It is, nevertheless, straightforward to incorporate
into our model a consumption tax and a tax on interest income.
8Domestic government bonds are then perfect substitutes for internally traded assets.
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where A = the nominal stock of government bonds in terms of foreign currency, and that
the evolution of government debt is subject to the following transversality condition:
lim
t!1¸ae
¡±t = 0. (7b)
Regarding monetary policy, we assume that the public sector sets a constant growth
rate of nominal balances. This implies that the accumulation of real money balances is
equal to
_m = (¾ ¡ p)m = (¾ ¡ p¤ ¡ e)m (7c)
where ¾ = _M=M is the growth rate of the nominal money supply. Following Bianconi
(1999), we will specify that both government expenditure and lump-sum taxes are set
proportional to output. In the case of government expenditure, this relationship cor-
responds to G(t) = g¤®K, where g¤ is a constant policy parameter, while in the case
of lump-sum taxes, the proportion T ¤(t) varies with time according to the relationship
T ¤(t) = T (t)=®K.9
To derive the °ow equation for the current account balance, we next substitute the
public sector constraint (7a) into private sector constraint (2a). This yields:
_b¡ _a = (1¡ g¤)®K ¡ c¡ I [1 + (h=2)(I=K)] + (i¤ ¡ p¤)(b¡ a): (8a)
Letting n ´ b¡a denote the real net credit position of the small open economy, we rewrite
(8a) as:
_n = (1¡ g¤)®K ¡ c¡ I [1 + (h=2)(I=K)] + (i¤ ¡ p¤)n: (8b)
This equation corresponds to the current account balance, which equals output net of
government expenditure, plus net interest income, less private expenditures on consump-
9If government expenditure generates utility services, then a policy that ¯xes the level of government
expenditure in proportion to the capital stock is infeasible in the small open economy framework, (see
Turnovsky 1996, 1997). Government expenditure must then be set in proportion to either the level of
consumption expenditure or to the level of wealth.
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tion and capital formation. For expositional purposes, we will assume that the economy
inherits a positive stock of initial credit, i.e., n(0) = n0 = b0 ¡ a0 > 0. Finally, the open
economy is subject to the following intertemporal solvency condition:
lim
t!1¸ne
¡±t = 0. (8c)
3. The Open Economy Growth Equilibrium
In this section we will derive the growth equilibrium of the open economy and the solutions
for the current account balance and overall level of welfare. First, to solve for the growth
rate of consumption, we take the time di®erential of (5a) and combine the resulting
expression with equation (6a) to obtain
_c
c
= ¡
_¸
¸
= (i¤ ¡ p¤)¡ ± = Ã (9a)
where Ã denotes the constant growth rate of consumption. According to this standard
Euler relationship, the growth rate of consumption equals the di®erence between the
world real interest rate and the domestic rate of time preference. Since the growth rate
of consumption is a function only of exogenous variables, it does not have transitional
dynamics. Solving (9a) yields the following expressions for the paths of consumption and
its shadow value
c(t) = c(0)eÃt; ¸ (t) = ¸(0)e¡Ãt (9b)
where the initial values c(0) and ¸(0) will be determined below.
To determine the equilibrium growth rate of the capital stock, we must determine the
behavior of the shadow price of physical capital, q. Rewriting (5e), the arbitrage condition
for capital, we obtain the following di®erential equation for q:
_q = (i¤ ¡ p¤)q ¡ ®(1¡ ¿)¡ (q ¡ 1)
2
2h
. (10)
10
In order to obtain an equilibrium with a constant growth rate of physical capital, the
expression for _q = 0 must have at least one real root. This requires that the steady state
solution satisfy the following quadratic equation,
®(1¡ ¿) + (q ¡ 1)
2
2h
= (i¤ ¡ p¤)q; (11)
where the necessary condition for equation (11) to possess real roots is given by:
®(1¡ ¿)  (i¤ ¡ p¤)
"
1 +
h(i¤ ¡ p¤)
2
#
. (12)
Using equation (11), we can solve for the two roots of _q = 0. By constructing a phase
diagram and using the solutions for physical capital (6c), the shadow value of wealth
(9b), and the transversality condition (5f), we can show that the steady state solution of
_q = 0 is equal to the smaller and unstable root, which implies that physical capital and
its shadow value do not display transitional dynamics.10 The equilibrium growth rate of
capital is then equal to
Á =
q ¡ 1
h
(13)
where q is stated in footnote 10.
The next step in our analysis is to calculate the equilibrium path of the real stock
of international credit. To do so, we substitute, using equation (6b), the expressions for
investment and physical capital, the path of consumption (9b), and i¤ ¡ p¤ = Ã + ± into
the current account balance (8b). This yields
_n = (Ã + ±)n+ ³K0e
Át ¡ c(0)eÃt; (14a)
10The expression for the equilibrium value of q is given by q = [1 + h(i¤ ¡ p¤)] ¡ p¢, where ¢ =
2h[(i¤ ¡ p¤) ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¿)] + h2(i¤ ¡ p¤)2. In addition, the cases q > 1, q < 1 can be identi¯ed. The ¯rst
obtains if (i¤ ¡ p¤) < ®(1 ¡ ¿), while the second occurs if (i¤ ¡ p¤) > ®(1 ¡ ¿). We will assume the
former holds so that equilibrium output growth is positive. See Turnovsky (1996, 1997) for a detailed
explanation of this type of analysis.
11
where
³ = (1¡ g¤)®¡ (q
2 ¡ 1)
2h
= q (Ã + ± ¡ Á)¡ (g¤ ¡ ¿ )®. (14b)
and where the second equality in (14b) is calculated using steady state arbitrage condition
(11). Following Turnovsky (1996), we can identify the quantity ³=(Ã + ± ¡ Á) as the
¯scal policy-adjusted price of capital, since it depends on both the capital tax rate and
the proportion of government spending in output. Integrating (14a), we can obtain the
following expression for the path of net foreign assets:
n(t) =
Ã
n0 +
³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡
c(0)
±
!
e(Ã+±)t ¡ ³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Áe
Át +
c(0)
±
eÃt. (15)
Applying the intertemporal solvency condition (8c) for the small open economy and sub-
stituting for ¸ (t) = ¸(0)e¡Ãt, we can show that the following relationships must hold:
Ã + ± ¡ Á > 0; (16a)
c(0) = ¸¡1 (0) = ±
Ã
n0 +
³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
!
: (16b)
Using the solution to q, (see footnote 10), we can con¯rm (16a). Equation (16b), in turn,
pins-down the initial level of consumption. Substituting the expression for c(0) into (15),
the equilibrium path of net credit then becomes:
n(t) =
Ã
n0 +
³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
!
eÃt ¡ ³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Áe
Át: (17)
Observe that the path of net credit|unlike that of consumption and physical capital|
displays transitional dynamics, since it is a function of both Ã and Á. Nevertheless, its
growth rate of _n=n will converge in the asymptotic limit to max(Ã; Á).11
11Whether Ã is greater or less than Á depends on sgn (Ã ¡Á). We can show that the di®erence (Ã ¡ Á)
is equal to
h¡1
p
¢ ¡ ±
where ¢ is de¯ned in footnote 10. Thus, for a \patient" consumer with a realtively \small" ±, (Ã ¡ Á) > 0,
and the small open economy accumulates net assets. The opposite holds if (Ã ¡ Á) < 0, which implies
that the economy accumulates international debts.
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We next derive the equilibrium path of real money balances, m(t). To calculate this
expression, we combine the equation for the accumulation of real balances (7c) with the
arbitrage condition (5b) and the ¯rst-order condition for consumption. After substituting
for c(t) = c(0)eÃt and using the fact that _¸ =¸ = ¡Ã, we derive the following equation
describing the evolution of real money balances:
_m = (Ã + ± + ¾)m¡ °c(0)eÃt. (18a)
Integrating this expression, we obtain the path of real money balances m(t), starting from
m(0):
m(t) = e(Ã+±+¾)t
Ã
m(0)¡ °c(0)
¾ + ±
³
1¡ e¡(¾+±)t
´!
. (18b)
The value of m(0) is then determined by imposing the transversality condition (5f) on
equation (18b). It implies
m(0) =
°c(0)
¾ + ±
(18c)
and yields the following solution for real money balances:
m(t) = m(0)eÃt =
°±
¾ + ±
Ã
n0 +
³K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
!
eÃt: (18d)
Equations (18c, d) imply that the initial level of real balances is proportional to the
initial level of consumption and that both grow at the common rate of Ã. Since m(0) =
M0=P (0), the expression for initial real balances also determines the initial domestic price
level and nominal exchange rate. The initial domestic price level and nominal exchange
rate are equal to, respectively, P (0) = M0=m(0) = (¾ + ±)M0=°c(0), E(0) = P (0)=P
¤
0 .
Thus, any variation in the domestic price level leads to an identical variation in the
nominal exchange rate. This, in turn, implies that the real values of nominal assets are
insulated from variations in the price level and nominal exchange rate due to the ¯xed
real exchange rate.
Using equation (7c), the equilibrium path of real balances also determines the equi-
13
librium rate of depreciation e, since:
_m
m
= Ã = ¾ ¡ p¤ ¡ e. (19a)
This relationship also ¯xes the equilibrium rate of domestic in°ation, which is equal to:
p = p¤ + e = ¾ ¡ Ã. (19b)
In other words, the domestic rate of in°ation equals the di®erence between the rates of
growth of nominal money balances and consumption.
We close this section by deriving the expression for economy's level of welfare, which we
identify with equation (1), the present discounted utility of the representative consumer-
producer. Employing our logarithmic parameterization and substituting equations (9b),
(16b), and (18d) into (1), we obtain the following expression for Z:
Z = (1 + °)±¡1 log ±
"
n0 + qK0 ¡ (g
¤ ¡ ¿)®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
#
+ °±¡1 log
°
¾ + ±
+ (1 + °)±¡2Ã: (20)
This expression reveals that consumer welfare depends on the government's ¯scal and
monetary policy variables, g¤, ¿ , ¾; the two equilibrium growth rates, Ã, Á; the inherited
stocks of net credit and physical capital, n0, K0; and such \fundamental" parameters as
the rate of time preference, the utility weight on real money balances, and the marginal
physical product of capital, ±, °, ®. In the section 6 of the paper we will calculate the
e®ect of changes in the ¯scal and monetary policy instruments on consumer welfare.
4. The E®ects of Policy on the Growth Equilibrium
In this section of the paper we will analyze the impact of government policy on the small
open economy equilibrium. Considering ¯rst the impact of a change in the proportion of
output devoted to government spending, g¤, we calculate the following comparative static
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expressions, using equations (6b), (9a), (13a), (16b), and (18c):
@Ã
@g¤
=
@q
@g¤
= h
@Á
@g¤
= 0; (21a)
@c(0)
@g¤
=
¡±®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á < 0;
@m(0)
@g¤
=
°
¾ + ±
@c(0)
@g¤
< 0: (21b)
Examining these expressions, we can conclude that while an increase in g¤ leaves the two
open economy growth rates unchanged, it lowers, through the resource-withdrawal e®ect,
the initial levels of consumption and real money balances.12
We next consider the e®ects of a change in the capital or income tax rate, ¿ . The
comparative static expressions are given by:
@Ã
@¿
= 0;
@q
@¿
= h
@Á
@¿
=
¡®
Ã + ± ¡ Á < 0; (22a)
@c(0)
@¿
=
±(g¤ ¡ ¿)h¡1®2K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)3 ;
@m(0)
@¿
=
°
¾ + ±
@c(0)
@¿
. (22b)
From equations (22) it is clear that while a cut in the tax rate ¿ does not a®ect Ã and,
thus, does not in°uence the growth rate of consumption, real money balances, it does
increase the shadow value of domestic capital and, consequently, raise the growth rate of
output.13 In addition, whether a decrease in the capital tax raises or lowers consumption
and real money balances depends on sgn (g¤ ¡ ¿). If (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0, then a cut in ¿ lowers
initial consumption and real money demand, while the opposite is the case if (g¤¡¿ ) < 0.
Because government spending is tied to output, a tax cut that raises Á will also increase
the growth rate of government spending. If (g¤ ¡ ¿) > 0, then this e®ect crowds-out
consumption through the resource-withdrawal e®ect. The opposite is true if (g¤¡ ¿ ) < 0,
since the tax cut in this case results in more resources for consumption.
12Observe that the decline in m(0) depends positively on the utility weight ° and negatively on the
rate of growth of nominal balances ¾.
13To derive the expression for @q=@¿ in (22a), we employed the expression for q in footnote 10 to
calculate @q=@¿ = ¡h®¢¡1=2. We then used the fact that Ã + ± ¡ Á = h¡1¢1=2 (see footnote 11) to
obtain @q=@¿ .
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Turning the question of the impact of monetary policy on the small open economy, we
can calculate that an increase ¾ in leads to the following equilibrium e®ects:
@Ã
@¾
=
@q
@¾
=
@Á
@¾
=
@c(0)
@¾
= 0;
@m(0)
@¾
=
¡°c(0)
(¾ + ±)2
< 0; (23a)
@e
@¾
=
@p
@¾
= 1: (23b)
Consistent with the classical dichotomy, an increase in the growth rate of nominal balances
lowers the demand for real money balances, but does not a®ect the equilibrium real growth
rates Ã and Á and the initial level of consumption. Given with the economy's interest rate
and purchasing power parity relationships, equation (23b) shows that a rise in ¾ leads to
a one-for-one increase in the rates of depreciation and domestic in°ation.
We complete this section by considering the impact of the these policy changes on
overall welfare, Z. Using equation (20), we can show that
@Z
@g¤
=
1 + °
±c(0)
@c(0)
@g¤
< 0;
@Z
@¿
=
1 + °
±c(0)
@c(0)
@¿
;
@Z
@¾
= ¡ °
±(¾ + ±)
< 0; (24)
where the expressions for @c(0)=@g¤ and @c(0)=@¿ are given, respectively, by equations
(21b) and (22b). Whether Z rises or falls in response to changes in g¤ and ¿ , depends on
whether initial consumption rises or falls. Thus, an increase in g¤ lowers overall welfare,
since it also lowers initial consumption. In contrast, a cut in ¿ raises overall welfare if it
increases initial consumption, which is the case if (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0. Finally, since an increase
in the rate growth of nominal balances lowers real money demand, a rise in ¾ directly
lowers Z: Observe that the size of the response of Z for all three policy shifts is scaled
by parameter °, which re°ects the role of real money balances in generating utility and
overall welfare. In section 6 below we will simulate numerically the impact of these policies
on Z.
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5. Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint
Preparatory to analyzing the e®ects of alternative ¯scal and monetary policies, we will
determine in this section the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint. This is
derived by ¯rst substituting [G(t)¡ T (t)] = [g¤ ¡ T ¤(t)]®K(t), K(t) = K0eÁt, _m = Ãm
and the equilibrium conditions (9a) and (18d) into the °ow government budget constraint
(7a). We then obtain:
_a¡ (Ã + ±)a = (g¤ ¡ (¿ + T ¤))®K0eÁt ¡ °¾c(0)
¾ + ±
eÃt (25a)
where c(0) is given by equation (16b). Assuming that the real stock of government debt
evolves from the initial value a0, integration of (25a) yields:
a(t) = a0e
(Ã+±)t +
(g¤ ¡ ¿)®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
³
eÁt ¡ e(Ã+±)t
´
+
°¾c(0)
(¾ + ±)±
³
eÃt ¡ e(Ã+±)t
´
¡®K0e(Ã+±)t
Z t
0
T ¤(s)e(Á¡(Ã+±))sds: (25b)
We then apply the transversality condition (7b) of the public sector to (25b) to obtain,
using ¸ (t) = ¸(0)e¡Ãt, the following expression for the constraint on the initial stock of
public debt:
Z 1
0
T ¤(t)e(Á¡(Ã+±))tdt =
a0
®K0
+
g¤ ¡ ¿
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡
°¾c(0)
± (¾ + ±)®K0
: (25c)
Observe that this expression determines the path of T ¤(t) required to maintain the in-
tertemporal solvency of the public sector. Substitution of this stock constraint into (25b)
then determines the equilibrium path of government debt:
a(t) = ®K0e
(Ã+±)t
Z 1
t
T ¤(s)e(Á¡(Ã+±))sds¡ (g
¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á e
Át +
°¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
eÃt: (25d)
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Equation (25d) reveals that the path of government debt, like that of net credit, is a
\mixed" process that depends on both open economy growth rates, Ã and Á. Next, using
the fact that T ¤(t) = [T (t)=®K0] e¡Át, the stock constraint (25c) can be rewritten in terms
of the path of lump-sum taxes:
V (T ) =
Z 1
0
T (t)e¡(Ã+±)tdt = a0 +
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡
°¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
: (25e)
We de¯ne V (T ) as the present discounted value of future lump-sum taxes that is required
to maintain public sector solvency. Following Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), we interpret
V (T ) as a measure of the \sustainability" of any combination of ¯scal and monetary
policies described by fg¤; ¿; ¾g. This means a shift in fg¤; ¿; ¾g must be accompanied by
a shift in V (T ) in order to sustain public sector solvency. Observe, in addition, that we
can identify the last two terms on the right-hand-side of (25e) with the primary de¯cit of
the public sector. We next consider how changes in ¯scal and monetary policy a®ect the
value of V (T ). For convenience we will assume in subsection 5.1 that the proportion T ¤ is
¯xed. Subsequently, we analyze in 5.2 how our results di®er if the government maintains
a balanced budget. We ¯nally solve in 5.3 for the ¯scal and monetary policies that insure
long-run government solvency.
5.1. A Constant T ¤ Policy
We begin by considering a budgetary stance that keeps the fraction T ¤ constant. Such a
policy implies that lump-sum taxes grow at the same rate as the capital stock and output,
so that T (t) = T0e
Át, where T0 is the implied initial level of lump-sum taxes. Substituting
T (t) = T0e
Át into (25e), we solve for the initial level of lump-sum taxes. It is given by:
T0 = (Ã + ± ¡ Á)
"
a0 ¡ °¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
#
+ (g¤ ¡ ¿k)®K0: (26a)
We can also calculate the path of government debt when the constant T ¤ policy is pursued.
Substituting T (t) = T0e
Át and the solution for T0 into the expression for a(t) given in (25d),
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we can show that a(t) is equal to:
a(t) = a0e
Át +
°¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
³
eÃt ¡ eÁt
´
: (26b)
This implies that the rate of growth of government debt, as in the case of net credit,
depends on max(Ã; Á).
Using our expression for V (T ), we next calculate the impact of changes in the fraction
output absorbed by the government, g¤, the tax rate on capital income, ¿ , and the growth
rate of nominal money balances, ¾, on the aggregate tax liability of the private sector in
the constant T ¤ case.14 For a shift in g¤ the change in the liability is given by:
@V (T )
@g¤ jT ¤
=
®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡
°¾
±(¾ + ±)
@c(0)
@g¤
=
µ
1 +
°¾
¾ + ±
¶
®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á > 0: (27)
This expression reveals that an increase in g¤ unambiguously raises the future tax burden
of the private sector. This is due to the direct e®ect of an increase in g¤ on the primary
¯scal de¯cit and because the rise in g¤ causes, through the resource-withdrawal e®ect, a
decline in consumption and real money demand, which, in turn, lowers the in°ation tax
base. In this context, observe that the rise in V (T )jT ¤ depends positively on the size of °.
Clearly then, the larger are the utility services of money, the more a rise in g¤ increases the
future tax burden. The existence of nominal assets serves to magnify the impact of a ¯scal
expansion on the private sector's future tax liabilities in the small open economy. This is
in contrast to the closed economy result of Bianconi (1999) in which a dynamic scoring
result is possible, due to a su±ciently large fall in the burden of real public debt. The
reason why dynamic scoring does not occur in this small open economy model is because
the nominal value government debt is de°ated by the exogenous foreign price level and not
by its domestic counterpart. Consequently, the increase in the domestic price level that
occurs to maintain money market equilibrium does not a®ect the real value of government
debt.15 The level of future private sector tax liabilities is, thus, una®ected through this
14These expressions will hold, however, even if the fraction T ¤ is not constant.
15Using the de¯nitions of P (0) and E(0) given above, the increases in the initial domestic price level
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channel. This will also be the case in our subsequent examples and will have a dramatic
impact on the in°uence of changes in g¤, ¿ , and ¾ if a balanced budget policy is pursued.
A marginal change in the tax rate on capital ¿ has the following impact on V (T )jT ¤
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤
=
¡®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á +
(g¤ ¡ ¿)®K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)2
@Á
@¿
¡ °¾
±(¾ + ±)
@c(0)
@¿
=
¡®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡

1 +
°¾
¾ + ±
¸
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )h¡1®2K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)3 (28a)
where we have substituted for the expressions for [@Á=@¿ ] and [@c(0)=@¿ ] given in equa-
tions (22a, b) to derive the second equality in (28a). Examination of the ¯rst equality in
equation (28a) shows that the impact of a decrease in the capital tax can be broken-down
into three parts. The ¯rst term in this expression describes the direct positive e®ect of
a cut in ¿ on the primary de¯cit, which acts to raise the tax liability V (T )jT ¤. The next
term in this equality describes the e®ects on V (T )jT ¤ that arise from a higher growth rate
Á. We observe that it has ambiguous e®ect on future liabilities, since it depends on sgn
(g¤ ¡ ¿). If (g¤ ¡ ¿) > 0, then the tax liability rises, because the accompanying increase
in government expenditure|recall that it is tied to the growth rate of physical capital
and output|swamps the increase in the tax base due to the higher growth rate Á. The
opposite is true if (g¤ ¡ ¿) < 0. In this case the increase in the tax base overwhelms the
rise in government expenditure and tends to lower V (T )jT ¤. Indeed, if this latter e®ect is
su±ciently strong, then dynamic scoring is possible.16 The third term in the ¯rst equality
of (28a) describes the in°uence of changes in the in°ation tax on the tax liability. Its
sign depends on whether initial consumption rises or falls subsequent to the cut in ¿ . If
c(0) rises, the case (g¤ ¡ ¿) < 0, then real money demand also increases, which, in turn,
increases in°ation tax revenue and tends to reduce the tax liability. The opposite holds
and exchange rate equal:
@P (0)=@g¤ = @E(0)=@g¤ = ¡ [P (0)=°c(0)] ¢ @c(0)=@g¤ > 0:
As such, purchasing power parity insulates the small open economy terms of trade from the shock to g¤.
16This means that dynamic scoring can take place in our model, unlike in Bruce and Turnovsky (1999),
even though the elasticity of substitution is unity.
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if c(0) falls, which is true if (g¤ ¡ ¿) > 0. Here, real money demand declines and, conse-
quently, so does in°ation tax revenue. If the former increase in in°ation tax revenues is
su±ciently strong, then a cut in ¿ can lower the future tax liability of the private sector
through this channel as well. These considerations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Dynamic Scoring and Reductions in the Capital Tax
(a) A su±cient condition for a cut ¿ to increase future tax liabilities is (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0.
That is:
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤
< 0 , (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0: (28b)
(b) In the case (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0, a su±cient condition for a cut in ¿ to reduce future tax
liabilities, i.e., to cause dynamic scoring is:
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤
> 0 ,

1 +
°¾
¾ + ±
¸
(g¤ ¡ ¿)
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)
@Á
@¿
> 1. (28c)
The proof of part (a) is obvious from our discussion above, since (28a) is unambiguously
negative if (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0. Part (b) is derived using the second equality of (28a), after
substituting for [@Á=@¿ ] and ¯nding the condition for [@V (T )=@¿ ]jT ¤ > 0 if (g
¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0.
In section 6 below, we simulate the model numerically to determine whether condition
(28c) is satis¯ed for a plausible set of parameter values.
We next calculate the impact of a balanced-budget tax cut on the value of future tax
liabilities. The expression is given by
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤; d¿=dg¤
=
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)2
@Á
@¿ jd¿=dg¤
¡ °¾
± (¾ + ±)
@c(0)
@g¤ jd¿=dg¤
=
°¾®K0
(¾ + ±) (Ã + ± ¡ Á) ¡
"
1 +
°¾
(¾ + ±)
#
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )h¡1®2K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)3 ; (29a)
where
@Á
@¿ jd¿=dg¤
=
@Á
@¿
;
@c(0)
@¿ jd¿=dg¤
= ¡±
"
1¡ (g
¤ ¡ ¿ )h¡1®
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)2
#
®K0
(Ã + ± ¡ Á) (29b)
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and where we have substituted for (29b) to obtain the second equality of (29a). Comparing
the equations (29a) to (28a), we observe that since fraction g¤ falls with ¿ in the balanced
budget case, the direct positive e®ect of a tax cut on the primary de¯cit washes-out. This
implies that the balanced budget tax cut in°uences future tax liabilities only through its
e®ect on the growth rate and in°ation tax revenues. Because, however, the growth rate
Á, according to (21a), is independent of g¤, this term has the same (ambiguous) impact
on future tax liabilities as in the previous case in which g¤ is held constant. On the other
hand, a balanced budget tax cut has a distinct impact on consumption and real money
demand, since the reduction in g¤ \crowds-in" consumption and real money balances and,
hence, acts to increase in°ation tax revenue.17 If the latter e®ect is su±ciently strong,
then dynamic scoring can take place even if (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0. Given these considerations, we
state the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Dynamic Scoring and Balanced-Budget Reductions in the Cap-
ital Tax
(a) The case (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0 is not a su±cient condition for a balanced-budget tax cut to
increase future tax liabilities. If (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) > 0, a su±cient condition for dynamic scoring
is:
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤; d¿=dg¤
> 0 ,
"
1 +
¾ + ±
°±
#
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)
@Á
@¿
> ¡1. (30a)
(b) A su±cient condition for a balanced-budget tax cut to reduce future tax liabilities
is (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0. That is:
@V (T )
@¿ jT ¤; d¿=dg¤
> 0 , (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0. (30b)
The proof of part (a) is determined using the second equality of (29a), after substituting
17A su±cient condition for a balanced-budget tax cut to increase c(0) if (g¤ ¡ ¿) > 0 is:
(g¤ ¡ ¿)
(Ã + ± ¡ Á)
@Á
@¿
> ¡1.
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for [@Á=@¿ ] and solving for [@V (T )=@¿ ]jT ¤; d¿=dg¤ > 0 if (g
¤ ¡ ¿) > 0. The proof of part
(b) is obvious, since the expression (29a) is unambiguously positive if (g¤ ¡ ¿) < 0.
Turning to monetary policy, a change in ¾ results in the following adjustment in the
private sector tax liability:
@V (T )
@¾ jT ¤
=
¡°c(0)
(¾ + ±)2
< 0. (31)
This implies that an increase in the rate of growth of nominal balances, as in the closed
economy model of Bianconi (1999), increases the in°ation tax revenues and reduces the
tax liability V (T )jT ¤. This, of course, also means that dynamic scoring cannot take place
after a cut in ¾. The impact on future tax liabilities in (31) is precisely one-half of
that calculated by Bianconi (1999). This re°ects, as before, the fact that the rise in
the domestic price level does not lower the value of public sector liabilities. Due to the
classical dichotomy, there is no dynamic feedback on the \real-side" of the economy and,
thus, on capital tax revenues.
5.2. A Balanced-Budget Policy
In this subsection we will consider the implications of a budgetary stance that maintains
a continuously balanced budget, i.e., a stance in which the primary de¯cit is always zero.
Such a policy choice implies the stock of government debt remains constant at its initial
level, i.e., a(t) = a0, 8t ¸ 0. Using our solution (25d) for the path of government debt,
this can be attained if ¯scal and monetary policy authorities take the following actions:
(i) set one of fg¤; ¿; ¾g so that
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á e
Át ¡ °¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
eÃt = 0; (32a)
(ii) set
T ¤(t) = T ¤0 e
¡Át; (32b)
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(iii) set
T0 = (Ã + ±) a0: (32c)
Note that step (i) eliminates the primary de¯cit through the choice of one of the policy
instruments. To satisfy (32a), the other two instruments are then left to freely adjust.
Observe also that due to the exponent terms in (32a), the choice one of fg¤; ¿; ¾g varies
through time. This is another consequence of the small open economy equilibrium, which
can maintain di®erent aggregate growth rates. Step (ii) implies that the fraction T ¤(t)
declines at the rate Á, while step (iii) ¯xes the initial level of lump-sum taxes T0 that
maintains the intertemporal solvency of the public sector. Taken together, the balanced-
budget policies (32a-c) imply that the private sector bears the following future tax liability
V (T )jBB = a0 (33)
which simply corresponds to the initial stock of government debt. Since, as we indicated
above, the nominal stock of government debt is de°ated by the exogenous foreign price
level, the tax liability in balanced budget equilibrium is independent of small changes
in g¤, ¿ , or ¾. This is contrast to the closed economy results of Bianconi (1999) and is
a further example of the limited scope of action possessed by the ¯scal and monetary
authorities in the small open economy.
5.3. Long-Run Fiscal Solvency
We indicated above that the intertemporal solvency of the public sector is a function of
the present discounted value of the tax liability V (T ). Another criterion for intertemporal
solvency|one that can be considered more stringent than the balanced-budget criterion|
is for the private sector's future tax liability to be equal to zero, V (T ) = 0.18 In terms of
18According to Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), V (T ) = 0 is \sustainable" in the sense that no further
policy shifts need be taken to maintain public sector intertemporal solvency.
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equation (25e) for the constant T ¤ case, this criterion implies
a0 +
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á ¡
°¾c(0)
±(¾ + ±)
= a0 +
µ
1 +
°¾
¾ + ±
¶ Ã
(g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0
Ã + ± ¡ Á
!
¡ °¾ (n0 + qK0)
¾ + ±
= 0 (34)
where we have substituted for c(0) to derive the second equality of (34). To maintain
long-run ¯scal solvency, one of the three policy tools fg¤; ¿; ¾g is chosen to satisfy (34).
Solving (34), we obtain the following expressions for fg¤; ¿; ¾g under this constraint
g¤ = ¿ ¡ (Ã + ± ¡ Á)(1 + °¾
¾ + ±
)¡1 ¢
½
a0
®K0
¡ °¾
¾ + ±
µ
n0
®K0
+
q
®
¶¾
; (35a)
¿ = g¤ + (Ã + ± ¡ Á)(1 + °¾
¾ + ±
)¡1 ¢
½
a0
®K0
¡ °¾
¾ + ±
µ
n0
®K0
+
q
®
¶¾
; (35b)
¾ =
¡± [(Ã + ± ¡ Á)a0 + (g¤ ¡ ¿)®K0]
(Ã + ± ¡ Á) [a0 ¡ ° (n0 + qK0)] + (1 + °) (g¤ ¡ ¿ )®K0 (35c)
where the other two policy tools are chosen freely. We will use these expressions in the
next part of the paper to simulate the welfare implications of maintaining of the public
sector solvency using the policy instruments (35a-c).19
6. Numerical Simulations
In order to assess the impact of the alternative policies on the liabilities of the private
sector that guarantee intertemporal solvency and to examine the welfare e®ects of the
alternative policies, we resort to a simple numerical simulation of the model. The bench-
mark set of parameter values is given at the bottom of Table 1 and is a plausible one,
since it leads to a positive endogenous growth rate and because the tax rate exceeds the
fraction of government spending in output, (g¤¡ ¿) < 0. In the context of the model, the
19In calculating equations (35a-c), we have treated q and Á parametrically, although they are, of course,
functions of ¿ . This discrepancy, nevertheless, will not materially a®ect our simulation results.
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parameters imply an equilibrium endogenous growth rate equal to 2% such that Ã = Á.
Additionally, the consumption share is about 53% of output, the initial stock of govern-
ment debt is 50% of output with the net foreign asset position is positive and equal to 5%
of output. We further assume that foreign nominal interest rate equals 10%, the foreign
in°ation is 4%, and, thus, that the foreign real interest rate is 6%. This parameterization
implies lump-sum tax credits, or transfers, on the order of 97% of output to guarantee
long-run intertemporal solvency.
Table 1 summarizes the e®ects of the alternative intertemporal budget policies as well
as e®ects of arbitrary marginal cuts in each of the policy instruments, fg¤; ¿; ¾g. The ¯rst
column of Table 1 denotes the change in the tax liability V (T ) relative to the benchmark
of the constant T ¤ policy. The second and third columns illustrate, respectively, the
change in welfare, Z, in the constant T ¤ case and change in welfare, ZjLC , in the case in
which the long-run constraint (34) binds. The expressions for the changes in welfare are
evaluated using equation (20).
The result of a cut in g¤ is a 58:8% welfare gain in the constant T ¤ case. In con-
trast, welfare falls by 47:6% if, instead, government spending is endogenously increased
to achieve long-run ¯scal solvency. Long-run solvency is satis¯ed here by increasing gov-
ernment spending, because the initial equilibrium is one in which private sector receives
positive transfers. A cut in government spending decreases the tax liability of the private
sector by 130:7% in the constant T ¤ policy. A reduction in the capital income tax yields
a much smaller welfare gain, about 5:2%, and results in an increase in the lump sum tax
liability of 88:2%. Consequently, a policy of simultaneously cutting government spending
and the tax rate yields a welfare gain of 64% and a decrease in the tax liability of 42:5%,
as we should expect from Proposition 2, since (g¤ ¡ ¿ ) < 0. Again, the long-run solvency
is achieved with a cut in the tax rate, because the initial equilibrium is one in which
there are lump-sum tax credits. If ¿ is cut to endogenously balance the budget, there
is a welfare gain equal to 13:3%. The de°ationary policy|reducing the rate of growth
of ¾|leads to very small welfare gains and changes in the private sector's tax liability
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when compared to the other two policy instruments in the constant T ¤ case. However,
a de°ationary policy that satis¯es the long-run constraint turns the in°ation tax into a
subsidy, which, as in Bianconi (1999), yields more signi¯cant welfare gains.
The key issue is the absence of dynamic scoring in the case of fall in the capital income
tax rate, holding g¤ constant. In order for condition (28c) of Proposition 1 to be satis¯ed,
we would have to choose an implausible parameterization of the model, in particular, in
terms of the di®erence in the growth rates (Ã ¡ Á). This suggests that the opportunities
for dynamic scoring in the case of the small open economy are limited. Indeed, even the
closed economy, Bianconi (1999) showed that a relatively \large" rate of time preference
compared to the rate of nominal money growth is required for dynamic scoring|brought
about by the in°ation tax and price level e®ects|to occur. But, as we have seen, the price
level e®ect is fully absorbed by movements in the nominal exchange rate in the small open
economy case, making this channel less e®ective and these parameters less important. In
the small open economy, the adjustment cost parameter, h, and the foreign interest and
in°ation rates, i¤and p¤, play key roles in determining the discrepancy between the growth
rates Ã and Á. Due, however, to the nonlinearities in the equilibrium, we were unable
to ¯nd a reasonable combination of parameters that resulted simultaneously in dynamic
scoring and a plausible di®erence in the growth rates. Nevertheless, if the alternative
policy of simultaneous cuts in g¤ and ¿ is enacted, a su±cient condition for dynamic
scoring is (g¤ ¡ ¿) < 0 and we observe in Table 1 that it does take place.
To sum-up, in the small open economy framework, a simultaneous cut in government
spending and the capital tax rate provides a welfare gain and reduction in tax liabilities.
This is the most attractive of our policy options, since attains both objectives|greater
welfare and lower tax liabilities|simultaneously. Cutting government spending alone has
a similar e®ect, but cutting tax rates (both on capital and on money balances) cannot
yield both objectives at the same time. The in°ation tax e®ects are quantitatively small
because of the denomination of domestic assets in foreign currency.
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7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the e®ects of ¯scal and monetary policies on the long-run
tax liability of the private sector in a small open economy model with nominal assets.
Among our major results, we found that a rise in the fraction output devoted to govern-
ment expenditure unambiguously increased the future tax liabilities of the private sector,
without any possibility \dynamic scoring." In addition, we analyzed the conditions in
which a tax cut results in dynamic scoring, i.e., a reduction in the long-run tax burden.
A key factor in the determination of our theoretical ¯ndings was the response of the in-
°ation tax base to the shift in ¯scal policy. The existence of nominal assets can either
magnify the e®ect of the change in ¯scal policy, as in the case of a government expen-
diture shock, or, as in the case of a tax cut, it can o®set the positive impact of the tax
cut on the primary de¯cit and lead to lower intertemporal tax burdens. Our simulation
results suggest that while dynamic scoring does not take place if the capital tax alone is
reduced, it can occur in the balanced-budget case. The one component of the tax burden
that the policy authorities cannot alter, however, is the real value of public sector debt,
which is determined by the exogenous foreign price level under purchasing power parity.
This factor limits the ability of the government to manipulate intertemporal tax burdens
in small open economies.
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TABLE 1
TAX LIABILITIES AND THE WELFARE GAINS/COSTS OF BUDGET
POLICIES IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
V (T ) Z ZjLC
A. Constant T ¤ Policy
g¤jT ¤constant < 0, g
¤ = 0:20 ¡130:7 58:8 {
¿jT ¤constant < 0, ¿ = 0:25 88:2 5:2 {
¾jT ¤constant < 0, ¾ = 0:04 0:3 0:2 {
g¤jT ¤constant < 0, g
¤ = 0:20; ¿ = 0:25 ¡42:5 64:0 {
B. Long-run Constraint
g¤jLC > 0 { { ¡47:6a
¿jLC < 0 { { 13:3a
¾jLC < 0 { { 29:5a
Notes: The ¯rst two columns represent the percentage changes in V (T ) and Z in the
benchmark Constant T ¤ Policy case.
aThese refer to the endogenous choices of fg¤; ¿; ¾g required to satisfy (35a,b,c), and
indicate percentage changes in welfare, ZjLC , if the long-run ¯scal constraint is imposed.
The benchmark set of parameter values are: h = 10; ± = 0:04; ® = 0:1; ¿ = 0:30;
g¤ = 0:25; ° = 0:025; ¾ = 0:04125; K0 = 10 (so that ®K0 = 1); M0 = 0:16; b0 = 0:50;
i¤ = 0:10; p¤ = 0:04; a0 = 0:45; n0 = 0:05. Also, the implied value of q is 1:2.
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